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Following technical and organisational changes, firms may react to increasing skill requirements either by 
training or hiring the new skills, or a combination of the two. Using matched datasets with about 1,000 French 
plants, we assess the relative importance of these external and internal labour market strategies. We show that 
skill upgrading following technological and organisational changes takes place mostly through internal labour 
markets adjustments. Consistently with the results in the literature, we find that new technologies and 
organisational changes are associated with an upward shift in the occupational structure within firms. We show 
that about one third of the upgrading of the occupational structure is due to hiring and firing workers on the 
external labour market, whereas two-thirds are due to promotions. Moreover, we find no compelling evidence of 
external labour market strategies based on "excess turnover". In contrast, French firms heavily rely on training in 
order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. When splitting the sample across sectors, this pattern of 
results appears to be particularly strong for manufacturing firms whereas, in services, external labour market 
strategies tend to be more widespread. We then consider the determinants of the strategies chosen by firms. We 
argue that the relative cost of internal versus external labour market flexibility is likely to be critical and that it 
can be partly captured by firm size and by the density on the local labour market. We find that external labor 
market strategies tend to be more important when firms are located on high-density labor markets. 
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Introduction 
Explaining the rise in wage inequalities has been high up on the research agenda of labour 
economists over the past two decades. Skill-biased technical change has emerged as a part of 
the explanation. In its simplest version, the story runs as follows: confronted with the falling 
price of computers and a relatively abundant supply of skilled labour, firms have adopted 
skilled-biased technologies, i.e. information-based technologies that substitute workers in 
routine tasks and complement workers in analytical and interactive tasks (Autor, Levy and 
Murnane, 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006). This has increased the demand for skilled workers on the 
labour market, generating in turn a rise in the relative wage of highly educated workers 
despite the rising skill supply (see Chennells and Van Reenen, 2002, for a review). The 
adoption of innovative workplace practices induced by the development of new technologies 
had very similar effects and further increased the relative demand for skilled labour (see 
Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001; Bresnahan et al., 2002 and Walkowiak, 2006). 
This simple story of skill-biased technical/organisational changes and (external) labour 
market equilibrium does not consider the role possibly played by internal labour markets, i.e. 
the way long-term relationships between the firms and their workers have evolved in relation 
with the adoption of new technologies and innovative work practices. However, this question 
is of particular relevance given the attention paid in recent years to potential changes in 
employment relations. Atkinson (1999) suggests that long-term employer-employee 
relationships have declined and, correspondingly, the perception of job insecurity has 
increased in most OECD countries in the 1990s (OECD, 2003). However, existing empirical 
evidence on rising job instability and the decline of internal labour markets is actually quite 
mixed
1
. A few recent papers have investigated how employment relations may have been 
affected by technological and organisational changes. They also provide contrasted evidence. 
A first strand of literature suggests that skill-biased technical change has contributed to a 
decline of internal labour markets. Givord and Maurin (2004) find that the use of new 
technologies increases the annual transition rate from employment to unemployment, and that 
this is enough to explain the global trend toward greater job insecurity observed in France. 
Consistently, Di Prete et al (2002) find that returns to tenure are lower in high-tech industries 
in the USA, suggesting that the "freshness" of workers has become more valuable than their 
                                                 
1
 See Neumark, Polsky and Hansen 1999; Gottschak and Moffitt 1999; Behaghel, 2003; Stevens (2005) and 
Farber (2007a, 2007b). 
  3/43 
experience in innovative firms. Cappelli and Neumark (2004) find more mixed results with 
new work practices being positively associated with external churning only in non-
manufacturing sectors. Looking at worker flows by skill levels in France, Askenazy and 
Moreno-Galbis (2007) find that ICT adoption is positively correlated with a higher turnover 
of clerks and manual workers whereas new organisational practices are positively correlated 
with a higher turnover of managers. For Germany, Bauer and Bender (2004) find that firms 
that introduce organisational changes have significantly higher job destruction and separation 
rates for the lowest skilled workers so that organisational change appears to be skill-biased. 
Moreover, they find that adjustments of the workforce following changes in workplace 
organisation mostly rely on external worker flows with the effect of internal flows being 
negligible. All these results suggest that firms meet the new skill requirements following the 
introduction of innovative workplace practices through adjustments on the external rather 
than internal labour market. 
However, another strand of literature suggests that the adoption of information technologies 
and innovative workplace practices also raises firms' investment in training, which is a typical 
internal labour market response. On US data, Lynch and Black (1998) find that the proportion 
of workers receiving formal training is higher in firms that use high performance work 
practices such as Total Quality Management, benchmarking or self-managed teams. Zamora 
(2006) finds similar results for France using a first-difference specification: the introduction 
of new work practices increases the proportion of trained workers, especially for blue-collars 
and middle-managers, both in the short and medium run. In contrast, the impact of 
technological changes on training is significant only in the short run, while fading away in the 
longer run. Behaghel and Greenan (2005) use matched employer-employee data for France 
and also find that a more innovative organisation increases the probability that workers 
receive training.  
As underlined by this review of the literature, most works consider only one type of labour 
market response to technological and organisational innovations. They either study internal or 
external labour market strategies, but rarely both at the same time. However, as suggested by 
Mincer (1989), these strategies are likely to be correlated with each other. Firms may react to 
increasing skill requirements either by combining in some way training with the hiring of new 
skills or they may, on the contrary, rely on one strategy at the expense of the other. The 
characteristics of this choice and its determinants are the focus of the present paper.  
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Using French data, we first show that, consistently with the results in the skill-bias literature, 
the adoption of new technologies and organisational changes is associated with an upward 
shift in the occupational structure within firms. We then investigate to what extent this shift 
may be ascribed to external rather than internal movements of the workforce. We show that 
about one third of the upgrading of the occupational structure is due to hiring and firing 
workers on the external labour market, whereas two-thirds are due to promotions. This 
suggests that adjustments on the internal labour market still play an important role in coping 
with increasing skill requirements. However, the distinction between skill upgrading through 
entries and exits and promotions may not capture all possible forms of external and internal 
labour market adjustments. External adjustments may also take the form of "excess turnover" 
– i.e. turnover in excess to what is necessary to upgrade the occupational structure - if firms 
try to acquire new skills by the adjunction of "fresh" workers. In contrast, they may train their 
own workers thus relying on the internal labour market. We find no compelling evidence of 
external labour market strategies based on "excess turnover". In contrast, French firms heavily 
rely on training in order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. When splitting the 
sample across sectors, this pattern of results appears to be particularly strong for 
manufacturing firms whereas, in services, external labour market strategies tend to be more 
widespread.  
We then investigate the determinants of the strategies chosen by firms. Choosing between 
external and internal labour market adjustments is likely to depend on the relative cost of both 
strategies. So, one may expect small firms to rely more on external labour market 
adjustments, due to the lack of workers with the required characteristics for promotion and/or 
training available within the firm. Similarly, firms located in areas where the labour market is 
dense can be expected to rely more on external adjustments than firms in low-density areas, 
because of the higher probability of finding workers with the right skills outside the firm. Our 
results suggest that firm's size does not make much of a difference in terms of external versus 
internal labour market strategies. In contrast, firms mostly rely on training in low-density 
areas whereas external labour market adjustments are much more frequent in high-density 
zones.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 outlines the econometric model. Section 2 
presents the data. The results are presented in Section 3 and some discussion and concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 4. 
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1. The Econometric model 
We build upon existing empirical models of skill biased technical/organisational change to 
develop a system of equations that describes how firms rely upon internal and external labour 
markets when they implement technical and organisational changes. This section describes 
the overall approach and the estimation method used. 
 
Skill biased technical and organisational changes 
Theoretical models of skill biased technical/organisational change predict a positive 
correlation (all other things kept equal) between the use of more advanced technologies and/or 
workplace practices and the skill level of the workforce. A very simple test would rely on the 
following regression: 
iiiii ORGATECHzSKILL εγδβ +++=     (1) 
where TECH and ORGA are technology and organisation measures, SKILL is a measure of the 
workforce’s skills, and z are control variables. One would then test whether δ  and γ  are 
positive.  
Taking first differences in order to get rid of unobserved heterogeneity in the variables in 
levels yields the following specification, most common in the literature:  
iiiii ORGATECHxSKILL υγδβ +∆+∆+=∆     (2) 
where xi is a vector of controls, iTECH∆  a vector of technical change variables, iORGA∆  a 
vector of organisational change variables and iυ an error term.  
We interpret positive estimates δˆ  and γˆ  as reduced-form evidence of a complementarity 
between technical/organisational change and the demand for skills. This interpretation relies 
on the ceteris paribus condition that we are able to observe plants that are similar in 
everything that is relevant for changes in the demand for skills, and that differ only in their 
technological/organisational practices. To mitigate potential missing variable biases, we 
introduce a broad set of controls (see section 3).  However, it must be borne in mind that our 
results are partial correlations that do not necessarily have a causal interpretation. 
The prediction from equation (2) is that technological and organisational changes are 
positively correlated with upward changes in the skill structure of the workforce. Skills, 
however, can be acquired through a variety of channels. In what follows, we consider three 
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possible channels: firms may upgrade the occupational structure of their workforce (which 
can be achieved though entries and exits or, alternatively through promotions); they may rely 
on excess turnover in order to acquire fresh skills; and/or, they may train their own workers. 
We interpret upward changes in the occupational structure through entries and exits as well as 
excess turnover as indicators of external labour market adjustments. Conversely, skill 
upgrading through promotions and training are seen as indicators of internal labour market 
strategies. 
 
Decomposing changes in the occupational structure 
Changes in firms' occupational structure following technological and/or organisational 
changes are usually estimated using standard labour share equations:  
ipipipiip ORGATECHxS υγ∆δ∆β∆ +++=    (3) 
where Sip is the share of occupational group p in the workforce of firm i.  
Such changes are the outcome of two different movements: (i) entries and exits of workers at 
various levels of the occupational structure and (ii) promotions of workers from lower to 
higher occupations. In order to distinguish both effects, we construct counterfactual changes 
in labour shares ( ipS
~∆ ) based respectively on entries and exits only and on promotions only. 
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where ip 1tL −  is number of workers in occupation p in firm i at time t-1, 
ip
tH  is the number of 
entries in occupation p in firm i between time t-1 and t and iptE  is the number of workers 
formerly employed in occupation p leaving firm i between time t-1 and t. Similarly, itL , 
i
tH , 
and itE  respectively denote the total number of workers, entries and exits in firm i at time t.  
Given that we do not have any direct information on promotions, changes in the occupational 






























=∆    (5) 
  7/43 
where iptL  is the number of workers in occupation p in firm i at time t. The number of workers 
in occupation p at t is computed as a counterfactual including only promotions, i.e. the 
number of workers observed at t in occupation p minus entries plus exits into that group 
between t-1 and t. In other words, it includes all people that would have been in occupation p 
at date t if there had been only promotions and no entries nor exits at this level between t-1 
and t. The corresponding labour share is computed by dividing this number of workers by 
what employment would have been in the firm at year t if no entries nor exits had taken place 
over the period.  
We then estimate equation (3) separately for ipS
~∆  and ipSˆ∆  by OLS, equation by equation. 
Note that the coefficients on the explanatory variables obtained when estimating equations (4) 
and (5) do not add up in general to those obtained when estimating equation (3): this is the 




Upgrading skills through excess turnover and training 
Another way to upgrade the skill structure of a firm following technological and 
organisational changes is through the addition of "fresh" workers by means of labour 
turnover. Turnover is, to some extent, a mechanical consequence of the upgrading of the 
occupational structure through entries/exits: there cannot be any upgrading of the 
occupational structure through entries/exits if there are no worker flows. However, as is well 
known from the literature on job and worker flows (for French firms, see Abowd, Corbel and 
Kramarz, 2003) worker flows (turnover) usually largely exceed what is needed for a given 
level of job flows. We therefore use a measure of ‘excess turnover’, i.e. turnover in excess to 
what is needed for a given change in the size of a group of workers. Specifically, excess 
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We then estimate: 
ippipipiip vqORGAnTECHxet +∆+∆+= ξ     (7) 
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by OLS equation by equation. pnˆ and pqˆ  are the estimates of interest; positive values indicate 
that technical/organisational change is associated with an increased turnover of group p, 
beyond what is mechanically implied by the upgrading of occupational groups. 
Similarly, skill upgrading through training needs to be analysed within each occupational 
group. Indeed, training rates are higher in high-skill groups, hence upgrading of the 
occupational structure through entries/exits mechanically generates an increase in training 
rates. Our data allows us to estimate training equations for a given occupational group: 
ippipipiip wtORGArTECHxT +∆+∆+= ψ     (7) 
which we estimate by OLS. prˆ  and ptˆ  are the estimates of interest; positive values indicate 
that technical/organisational change is associated with an increase in training, once controlled 
for composition effects due to the upgrading of the occupational structure through 
entries/exits. 
 
2. The Data 
Measuring technological and organisational changes within establishments and skill 
upgrading through our 3 channels requires combining several databases.  
Information on technological and organisational changes comes from the REPONSE survey 
(RElations PrOfessionnelles et NégocationS d’Entreprise). In 1998, 2978 establishments were 
surveyed with senior managers being asked questions about industrial relations, 
implementation of new technologies and reorganisations
3
. The questions on organisational 
and technological changes relate to the previous three years, so that the survey provides 
measures of changes within establishments over the period 1996 to 1998.  
Our preferred measure of organisational changes is based on the following question: “During 
the last three years, did your establishment experience an important organisational change?”  
It is a very general question but the advantage is that it explicitly refers to a change in 
organisation and that it is meaningful both in manufacturing and services. We define 
organisational change as a dummy variable equal to 1 when the manager answers yes and 0 
otherwise. As robustness checks, we also use alternative variables capturing innovative work 
                                                 
3
 The REPONSE survey was conducted in 1992, 1998 and 2005. Panels that result from the merging of the three 
waves contain few observations and therefore can not be used. Moreover, one of the databases used in this paper 
(ESE) is not available from 1999 onward. 
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practices. The first one is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has reduced the number 
of hierarchical layers between 1996 and 1998 (delayering). This variable nicely captures 
changes in organisation but it is likely to be mechanically correlated with changes in the 
occupational structure, which is a problem for us. Additional indicators of innovative work 
practices are just-in-time management methods (with clients or providers) and total quality 
management, which are probably more relevant in manufacturing than in service sectors.  
Regarding technological change, the REPONSE survey provides information on the 
proportion of workers using computerised equipments, in particular computer and digital 
networks (less than 5%, 5 to 19%, 20 to 49%, 50% and more). Given that these technologies 
were at the very beginning of their life cycle in France in 1996, we assume that the proportion 
of workers using them in 1998 provides a good approximation of technological adoption over 
1996-1998. More specifically, we define a dummy variable equal to 1 if 20% or more workers 
use computer and digital networks. The REPONSE survey also provides information on the 
proportion of workers using personal computers. We construct a dummy variable equal to 1 
when this proportion is greater than 50%. Similarly, we also define a variable equal to 1 when 
the establishment uses computer assisted systems. Both variables are used to conduct 
robustness checks. 
The REPONSE survey also provides detailed information on firms and establishments which 
we use as control variables in the regressions: firm characteristics (public/private, firm with 
one or several plants, listed on stock markets/non-listed), plant characteristics (rural or urban 
localisation, share of women, share of part-time workers), industrial relations (presence of 
union delegates), as well as a set of industry and plant size dummies. 
In order to capture worker flows, we rely on two different sources. The DMMO has 
exhaustive data on entries and exits of workers in and out of establishments with 50 
employees or more. The data is broken down into five occupational categories: managers and 
professionals
4
, technicians and supervisors, clerks, skilled blue collars and unskilled blue 
collars. The EMMO has identical information on a representative sample of firms with less 
than 50 employees. We use this data to compute counterfactual changes in labour shares over 
1996-1998, i.e. changes that are due only to entries and exits (resp. promotions) in the various 
occupations over the period. In order to do so – see equations (4) and (5) – we also use 
information on the level of employment in each occupational cell at the beginning and at the 
                                                 
4
 This category also includes engineers.  
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end of the period. This information is provided by the French survey of employment 
structure: the ESE, as of December 31
st 
1995 and 1998. 
The last channel we consider for skill upgrading is training. The so-called “24-83” fiscal 
records provide firm-level data on the number of workers receiving training and the volume 
of training hours
5
. This information is broken down into five occupational categories which 
are identical to those in the DMMO-EMMO database. For each occupation, we thus compute 
both the proportion of workers receiving some training and the average number of training 
hours per worker. These are averaged over 1996-1998 in order to account for the fact that 
training may take some time to be implemented following technological and organisational 
changes.  
Matching the five datasets and cleaning out establishments with implausible values for skill 
upgrading reduces our sample to 1,114 establishments – see the Data Appendix for details. 
Table A1 summarises all the variables used in our models. Our sample consists mainly of 
large plants (53% have more than 200 workers) belonging to multi-establishment firms of the 
private sector. 77% have a union delegate and less than half of them are listed. The 
manufacturing sector is over-represented in our sample: it accounts for 80% of total 
employment, compared to only 20% in the whole French economy. As a consequence, 
women account for only 35% of the labour force. Lastly, 37% of the plants employ more than 
5% of part-time workers. Over 1996-1998, occupational changes have been substantial in our 
sample. The proportion of managers and professionals has increased on average in all plants, 
but the rise has been more important in establishments that have introduced technological and 
organisational changes. The share of technicians and supervisors has also increased, 
especially in large manufacturing plants. In contrast the share of clerks, skilled and unskilled 
blue-collars has decreased. This is particularly the case in innovative establishments, except 
for the proportion of skilled blue-collars which has increased following organisational 
changes. Finally, the reduction in the share of clerks and skilled blue-collars has been much 
stronger in services than in manufacturing, while the opposite holds for unskilled blue-collars. 
Much of these changes seem to be due to internal movements of the labour force. 
Consistently, training appears to be frequent, although access is greater in larger plants and 
for more skilled occupations. In what follows, we use regression analysis in order to further 
investigate these changes.  
                                                 
5
 The "24-83" records provide firm rather than plant-level data on training. Matching them with establishment-
level data generates some measurement error that is likely to raise the standard errors in our estimates. 
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3. Results 
3.a Technological change, organisational change and skill upgrading strategies 
We first investigate the impact of technological and organisational changes upon the 
strategies adopted by firms to upgrade the skills of their workforce. Table 1 presents the 
results for the three different forms of skill upgrading we consider here: upward shift in the 
occupational structure through entries/exits versus promotions, excess turnover and training.  
The first panel of Table 1.1 provides evidence of skill-biased technological and organisational 
changes. The use of computer and digital networks is associated with a significant shift 
upward in the occupational structure and, more specifically with an increase in the proportion 
of managers and professionals. Organisational changes are also associated with more 
managers and professionals, although the coefficient is significant at the 10% level only. 
These results are consistent with the existing evidence in the skill-bias literature: both 
technological and organisational changes tend to shift the occupational structure upward. 
As a second step, we try to disentangle the role of internal versus external movements of the 
workforce in accounting for this upgrading of the occupational structure. Entries and exits do 
not seem to play a key role here. Following the introduction of new forms of organisation, all 
changes in the occupational structure take place through internal movements, i.e. through 
promotions. These tend to reduce the proportion of unskilled blue-collars in favour of skilled 
ones. Similarly, the use of computer and digital networks is associated with more workers 
being promoted into managerial positions. Part of the upward shift in the occupational 
structure following technological changes is also due to managers and professionals being 
hired from outside the firms. However, external movements only account for about one third 
of the overall increase in the proportion of managers and professionals, whereas promotions 
account for some 60%. This first set of results suggests that internal labour markets still play 
an important role when firms have to cope with increasing skill requirements. Most of the 
adjustment in the occupational structure actually takes place through promotions, whereas the 
relative importance of entries and exits to and from the external labour market remains rather 
limited.  
However, firms may also try to upgrade the skill level of their workforce by bringing in "fresh 
workers" with new skills, beyond what would be necessary to upgrade the occupational 
structure through entries and exits. Table 1.2 thus investigates the partial correlations between 
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technological/organisational changes and excess turnover. We find no compelling evidence of 
such a correlation: organisational changes are not associated with excess turnover, whatever 
the category of workers we consider. Similarly, although the use of computer and digital 
networks is positively associated with excess turnover of clerks and unskilled blue-collars, the 
estimated coefficients are not significant at conventional levels. Overall, the external labour 
market does not appear as a key provider of new skills when firms introduce changes in their 
technology and/or work organisation.   
In contrast, firms heavily rely on training in order to upgrade the skill level of their workforce. 
Table 1.3 has the partial correlations between technological and organisational changes on the 
one hand and two different measures of training on the other hand. As evidenced by Panel A, 
organisational changes increase the access to training for all categories of workers except for 
clerks - where the positive effect is not significant - and for unskilled blue-collars - where the 
coefficient is negative although insignificant. As for technological changes, they are 
associated with a higher proportion of trainees among managers and professionals but also 
among clerks whereas they have no significant impact upon the other groups of workers. 
When coming to the number of hours of training per worker, the effect of computer and 
digital networks remains positive and significant for managers and professionals, and clerks. 
In contrast, organisational changes are less systematically associated with an increase in 
training, with the estimates being positive and significant for technicians and supervisors 
only.  
So, when considering the firms in our sample all together, our results suggest that the internal 
labour market still plays a key role in the adjustment of the skill level of the workforce 
following technological and organisational changes. Promotions account for the largest part of 
the upgrading in the occupational structure, and training is used as a complementary strategy 
to raise the skill level of workers in a majority of occupations – except for unskilled blue-
collars. 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we re-run our basic set of regressions using 
alternative measures of technological and organisational changes (see Appendix Tables A2 
and A3). Tables A2-1 and A2-2 have the results for personal computers and computer assisted 
systems respectively. Both of them include our preferred measure of organisational change as 
well as all the control variables used in Tables 1 through 3. The pattern of results for personal 
computers is very similar to that of digital networks: the proportion of workers using a PC is 
correlated with an upward change in the occupational structure, which is mostly due to 
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internal labour market adjustments (except for managers and professionals where external 
movements are equally important). In contrast, the use of PCs is not significantly associated 
with excess turnover, whereas it is correlated with more training being offered, in particular to 
skilled blue-collars. The results are less stark when using computer assisted systems as an 
explanatory variable (Table A2-2): it does not generate any significant change in the 
occupational structure. However, it is associated with lower labour turnover, especially for 
skilled blue-collars and with more hours of training for managers and professionals. Similar 
tests are conducted for alternative measures of organisational change (Tables A3-1 to A3-3). 
They all include the use of computer and digital networks as a control variable – in addition to 
our standard controls. Although not as strong as for the organisational change variable, the 
results are very similar: when the occupational structure is upgraded, this is done through 
internal rather than external labour market adjustments – see Tables A3-1 and A3-2 for 
delayering and just-in-time. New work practices (and in particular total quality management) 
are associated, if anything, with reduced labour turnover. Moreover, they tend to raise the 
number of hours of training offered to unskilled blue-collars (following delayering) and to 
technicians and supervisors (when the establishment uses just-in-time management methods). 
The important role of the internal labour market in upgrading the skill level of the workforce 
therefore seems to be a characteristic of the French human resource management model. One 
can wonder however whether this model is common to all sectors of the French economy or 
whether it is specific to some of them.  
3.b The sectoral dimension of skill upgrading strategies 
In order to investigate this issue, we split our sample across manufacturing and services and 
re-run all the estimates. The results are reported in Tables 2.1 to 2.3. As can be seen from 
Panel A of Table 2.1, changes in the occupational structure following organisational and 
technological changes are much more important in the manufacturing sector than in services. 
In the former, organisational changes appear to be biased against unskilled labour and in 
favour of clerks, while the use of computer and digital networks is biased in favour of 
managerial positions. In services, only technological change appears to be skill-biased in the 
sense that it is associated with a higher proportion of managers and professionals. Moreover, 
promotions play a much more important role in manufacturing than in services. They account 
for almost all changes in the occupational structure in manufacturing industries, whereas in 
  14/43 
services the increase in the share of managers and professionals following technological 
changes is mainly due to entries and exits from the external labour market.  
The pattern of results regarding excess turnover (Table 2.2) indicates that adjustments on the 
external labour market exist in the manufacturing sector, for managers and professionals and 
following organisational changes. This is not the case in services where neither technological 
nor organisational changes are significantly correlated with excess turnover. However, this 
cannot be interpreted as an indication of external adjustments being more widespread in 
manufacturing than in services. Training is indeed widely used by manufacturing firms in 
order to upgrade the skill level of the workforce, whereas this is not the case in the service 
sector. As evidenced in panels A and B of Table 2.3, both technological and organisational 
changes are associated with a greater proportion of trainees in the various occupational groups 
in manufacturing sectors. This is the case for managers and professionals, clerks and skilled 
blue-collars (at the 10% significance level) when computer and digital networks are used and 
for technicians and supervisors, skilled blue-collars and managers and professionals (at the 
10% level) when important changes in organisation are introduced. The results are weaker for 
organisational changes when we consider the number of training hours per worker, but they 
remain very strong for technological changes. This is not the case in services where the only 
significant effect is on managers and professionals and following organisational changes.  
This second set of results thus suggests that the resistance of internal labour markets is 
particularly strong in the manufacturing sector. Changes in the occupational structure mostly 
take place through promotions and training is a very widespread strategy in order to upgrade 
the skill level of the workforce. The situation is quite different in services where technological 
and organisational changes are not associated with much effort to upgrade the skill level of 
the workforce. Adjustments on the internal labour markets are very limited but external 
adjustments are not more frequent. This suggests that innovations are not so strongly 
associated with rising skill requirements in services as they are in manufacturing sectors. And 
this, independently of the choice made by firms between internal versus external labour 
market adjustments.  
One question raised by these results has to do with the potential role of firm's size. Is the 
resistance of internal labour markets really specific to the manufacturing sector or is it due, 
and to what extent, to the fact that manufacturing firms are on average larger than service 
ones? Size could well be a key factor because internal labour markets are probably wider and 
therefore less costly to use in large firms than in small ones. More generally, this raises the 
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question of the circumstances in which firms may have an incentive to choose internal rather 
than external labour market adjustments.  
3.c Skill upgrading strategies according to firms' size and density on the local labour 
market 
One reason for firms to choose internal rather than external labour market adjustments is, of 
course, the relative costs of both strategies. As mentioned above, the cost of internal labour 
market adjustments should be decreasing in firm size. Small firms do not necessarily have the 
right people to promote and/or train internally, whereas large ones have large pools of 
workers among whom they may find the required skills, either immediately or after some 
training. Similarly, the cost of external labour market adjustments is likely to be impacted by 
the size of the local labour market: all other things equal, the larger it is, the less costly it will 
be for firms to find the workers with the skills they need. In order to test the impact of the 
related costs upon firm's strategies, we re-estimate our basic set of regressions after splitting 
our sample across size and local labour market density.  
Tables 3.1 to 3.3 investigate the various channels used to upgrade the skill structure in large 
versus small plants. Large plants are defined as those having more than 200 workers (the 
median size). Overall changes in the occupational structure following technological and 
organisational changes appear slightly more frequent in small firms than in large ones: the use 
of computer and digital networks affects both managers and professionals (positively) and 
clerks (negatively) in the former whereas they only affect managers and professionals in the 
latter. Whatever the size of the firm though, these occupational changes appear to be mostly 
due to promotions, with entries and exits being essentially insignificant. Excess turnover 
increases with organisational changes for skilled blue-collars in small plants whereas the 
negative effects (on skilled blue-collars in small plants and unskilled blue-collars in large 
ones) are not statistically significant at conventional levels. As regards training, firms' 
strategies do not significantly differ across size. The precision of the estimates is often limited 
(at the 10% level only), but training seems to be used both by small and large firms following 
technological and organisational changes. Overall, the choice of upgrading the skill level of 
the workforce through internal rather than external labour market adjustments does not seem 
to depend much on firms' size.  
Regarding the density of the local labour market, the patterns of results provided in Tables 4.1 
to 4.3 appear to be more differentiated. High-density (resp. low-density) areas are defined as 
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having a density of workers above (resp. below) the median. As evidenced in Table 4.1, 
upgrading of the occupational structure through promotions is much more frequent in high-
density areas than in low-density ones. Entries and exits are also more frequent, at least for 
managers and professionals. So, from this first set of results, one cannot ascribe upward 
changes in the occupational structure to any specific channel in low-density areas, whereas 
both promotions and, to a smaller extent, entries and exits seem to be used in high-density 
local labour markets. As regards excess turnover, it is clearly more frequent in high-density 
environments than in low-density ones following technological changes. The pattern of results 
is more balanced for the access to training which seems to increase with technological and 
organisational changes in both types of labour markets. However, when coming to the number 
of training hours per worker, no significant effect is found in high-density areas whereas both 
new technologies and new forms of work organisation are associated with more training hours 
in firms located in low-density labour market. Overall, skill upgrading through external labour 
market adjustments appears to be more widespread in high-density areas than in low-density 
ones. Conversely training on the internal labour market is more widely used in low-density 
areas, even if this does not lead to more promotions taking place. 
Overall, this second set of results shows heterogeneous responses along different dimensions: 
sector, plant size and local labour market characteristics. As these dimensions are not 
orthogonal, it is important to check whether the pair wise comparisons made so far by 
stratifying the sample still hold when all dimensions are analysed simultaneously. Appendix 
table A4 shows that this is broadly the case. Interactions between the technical/organizational 
change variables on the one hand, and indicator variables for high-density labour markets, 
large plants and services, on the other hand, are introduced in the same regressions; the 
reference is the apparent effect for small manufacturing plants located in low-density local 
labour markets. Other things kept equal, high-density labour markets witness more 
adjustments of the occupational structure when adopting new technologies and organisational 
practices. This takes place through more important internal movements, and through more 
external movements (though the latter difference is not statistically significant). They also 
witness more excess turnover. Large plants witness significantly less excess turnover among 
skilled blue-collars when implementing organizational changes, and more training when 
implementing technological changes. All this is consistent with the simpler stratified analyses. 
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4. Discussion 
In this paper, we have taken a fresh look at the issue of skill-biased technical and 
organisational change, following Mincer’s insight that it is important to know whether the 
skill upgrading of the firms’ workforce takes place through hiring or training for the new 
skills. Assessing the responses of internal labour markets to changes in the technology and the 
organisation of firms seems indeed useful to understand recent evolutions in labour markets 
better than by just modelling them as price and quantity adjustments on a spot market.  
Our empirical results suggest that most of the adjustments that have taken place in France 
following the introduction of new technologies and innovative workplace practices have gone 
through the internal rather than external labour market. As already evidenced by many papers 
in the literature, technological and organisational changes are associated with and upward 
shift in the occupational structure. But this is largely achieved through promotions rather than 
entries and exits from the external labour market. Moreover, when introducing new 
technologies and/or organisational practices firms massively rely on training in order to 
upgrade the skill level of their workforce, whereas the use of excess turnover as a provider of 
new skills remains rather limited. This resistance of internal labour markets is particularly 
strong in manufacturing sectors. In services, adjustments in the skill level of the workforce 
appear much less important following technological and organisational changes. This 
difference between manufacturing and service sectors does not only capture a size effect: 
when splitting our sample across firm's size no clear pattern of human resource management 
appears. In contrast, external labour market adjustments tend to be more frequent in firms 
located in high-density areas, whereas training is more widespread in low-density zones. One 
explanation for this pattern of results may be that the relative cost of external rather than 
internal labour market adjustments is higher when employment density is lower.  
These results suggest adding one step to the simple story of skill-biased technical change with 
which we started. Facing lower computer prices, firms had incentives to adopt skilled-biased 
technologies and organisational practices and to employ more skilled labour. But to do so, 
they faced a trade-off: either find the new skills on the external labour market or find them on 
their internal labour market by training their existing workforce. In France, they 
predominantly chose the latter strategy, though the reliance on the external labour market was 
stronger in dense local labour markets with high supply of skilled labour, as external 
adjustments were less difficult. 
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This story has the virtue of simplicity and is consistent with the partial correlations we find. 
However, in the absence of causal estimates, we cannot prove that this mechanism is the right 
one. We briefly consider alternative stories, and examine whether they are also consistent 
with the evidence we provide.  
The first story is one of spurious correlations due to unobserved shocks. A first way to see 
that is that firms that are hit by unfavourable shocks (say, a falling demand for their product) 
have to cut costs. To that end, they adopt cost saving technologies and new forms of work 
organisation; they also downsize, and the burden of the adjustment is disproportionately born 
by the unskilled. This sequence of events would generate a spurious correlation between 
technical/organisational changes and upgrading of the occupational structure through entries 
and exits. Therefore, wrongly ignoring the potential role of unobserved shocks would make us 
overestimate the external labour market response to technical and organisational changes. 
This rather reinforces our result on the predominance of internal adjustments. However, 
unobserved shocks may also work the other way round. Firms that are hit by a positive shock 
may introduce new technologies and innovative work practices (because they have more cash 
available for investment). The French regulation on the financing of continuous training is 
such that over the 1996-1998 period, all firms had to spend at least 1.5% of their wage bill on 
training. For those firms for which this constraint is binding, any positive shock that raises the 
wage bill will mechanically generate an increase in training expenditure. In this case, the 
positive correlation we find between new technologies/organisational changes and training 
may be spurious. In order to check whether this is the case, we re-ran our training regressions 
on the sub-sample of firms spending more than 2% of their wage bill on training. For these 
firms, the legal minimum is not binding so that there is no reason that an increase in their 
wage bill should lead them to invest more in training. When doing this, our results are 
virtually unchanged
6
. Another way to control for positive shocks in our regressions is to 
introduce changes in firm's size over 1996-1998 as a control variable. Here again, the 
correlations between technological/organisational changes and training are unchanged
7
.  
                                                 
6
 The coefficients (standard errors) of the organisational change variable in the regression for the proportion of 
trainees are: 7.07 (2.04) for managers and professionals, 10.3 (3.33) for technicians an supervisors, 2.88 (2.01) 
for clerks, 5.54 (2.56) for skilled blue-collars and -15.42 (22.94) for unskilled blue-collars. For technical change, 
the corresponding coefficients are: 6.59 (2.08) for managers and professionals, 4.21 (3.00) for technicians an 
supervisors, 4.67 (1.99) for clerks, 3.36 (2.09) for skilled blue-collars and -4.54 (14.94) for unskilled blue-
collars. 
7
 The coefficients (standard errors) of the organisational change variable in the regression for the proportion of 
trainees are: 5.12 (2.41) for managers and professionals, 8.28 (3.20) for technicians an supervisors, 2.28 (1.91) 
for clerks, 5.54 (2.56) for skilled blue-collars and -13.75 (20.44) for unskilled blue-collars. For technical change, 
the corresponding coefficients are: 4.73 (2.04) for managers and professionals, 2.66 (2.75) for technicians an 
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A second story is more specific to France. Starting in 1993, successive governments have 
introduced fiscal measures to reduce the labour cost of low-wage workers. These measures 
have had the largest impact on firms employing a high proportion of low-skill workers. As a 
result, these firms were less induced to adopt new technologies (as long as they are substitutes 
to unskilled labour) while they had incentives to hire even more low-skill workers. It might 
also have changed their behaviour toward training, though the direction is not obvious: firms 
might have refrained from training those workers who would not have been eligible for the 
tax exemption had their wage increased following training. This, however, does not concern 
high-wage workers whose training appears to be highly correlated with new technologies in 
our data. Moreover, the additional contingents of low-wage workers paid at the minimum 
wage would probably not get any wage increase following training, given that their 
productivity would, most probably, remain below the minimum wage. Overall, it is unclear 
whether training should have decreased or increased in low-wage firms that did not adopt new 
technologies. The story tends to go in the direction of overestimating the adjustments through 
the external labour market. 
The third story has to do with imperfect competition and rent sharing. Firms that earn high 
profits can more easily invest in the last consultant’s hype and afford costly new technologies 
and organizational practices. They can also afford to train their workers and offer them 
promotions. The workers are attached to the firm if they get a share of the rent. This story 
would entail a spurious correlation between technical/organisational changes, internal 
movements and training. As such, it directly competes with our story in order to account for 
our empirical evidence. There are three arguments against this story, however: first, 
technological and organisational innovations are not just management fads: they actually raise 
firms' productivity (see Black and Lynch, 2004). Moreover, internal labour market 
adjustments are stronger in the manufacturing sector than in services, whereas manufacturing 
is more  exposed to international competition than services, hence less likely to provide firms 
and workers with high rents. Third, this story does not account for the sensitivity to local 
labour market conditions when deciding between internal and external labour market 
adjustments. 
                                                                                                                                                        
supervisors, 5.07 (1.98) for clerks, 3.04 (1.99) for skilled blue-collars and -7.72 (17.25) for unskilled blue-
collars. 
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Overall, we view our results as providing evidence that internal labour markets have remained 
a viable strategy for French firms to upgrade the skill level of their workforce following the 
adoption of new technologies and organisational practices. 
Where do we go from here? The resistance of internal labour markets in France, even in the 
context of technological and organisational innovations, could be the sign that internal labour 
markets are not necessarily deemed to die in knowledge-based economies. However, it could 
also be the outcome of a highly protective employment protection legislation (see OECD, 
2004): firms may rely on internal labour market adjustments because going on the external 
labour market would simply be too costly. This idea has long been put forward by Bishop 
(1991). However, recent evidence by Bassanini et al. (2007) suggests that the amount of 
training provided by firms would actually be negatively correlated to employment protection 
legislation. In order to get a better understanding of these relations, the comparison of France 
with other countries would be potentially very fruitful. The USA or the UK stand as 
particularly good candidates given that employment protection legislation is much less strict 
in these countries than in France. This would allow to check whether the introduction of new 
technologies and workplace practices have had a different impact on firms' labour market 
strategies in these countries. It would also permit to compare the various determinants of skill 
upgrading strategies across countries. An important avenue for future research is indeed to tie 
down the extent to which labour market institutions are likely to affect firms' strategies in 
terms of human resource management.  
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0.36* -0.26 -0.11 0.46 -0.46
(0.20) (0.28) (0.29) (0.38) (0.35)
Technical change 0.95*** -0.20 -0.40 -0.06 -0.29
(use of digital networks) (0.19) (0.27) (0.27) (0.34) (0.32)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-squared 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
0.24 -0.25 0.03 0.65* -0.67**
(0.19) (0.30) (0.31) (0.38) (0.34)
Technical change 0.60*** 0.01 -0.28 -0.17 -0.16
(use of digital networks) (0.19) (0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.33)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-squared 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07
0.14 -0.00 -0.19 -0.16 0.21
(0.16) (0.23) (0.19) (0.27) (0.27)
Technical change 0.34** -0.21 -0.09 0.11 -0.15
(use of digital networks) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19) (0.24) (0.25)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03







Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, 
listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy 
variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part-time) and 16 sectors. 
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0.74 5.76 -3.72 5.39 -52.37
(2.15) (5.58) (7.85) (4.95) (64.04)
Technical change -0.82 -1.64 12.44* 5.50 153.80*
(use of digital networks) (2.18) (2.69) (7.00) (3.93) (90.44)
Number of observations 1090 1094 1104 1010 790




Notes:       
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) Regressions include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being 
located in a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, 
presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with 
more than 5% of workers being part- time) and  16 sectors. 
 
 










6.14*** 8.35*** 2.28 5.12** -13.50
(2.02) (3.22) (1.91) (2.41) (20.28)
Technical change 4.81** 3.02 5.07** 3.16 -8.11
(use of digital networks) (2.03) (2.81) (1.97) (2.05) (17.46)
Number of observations 1097 1052 1087 892 646
R-squared 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.03
1.69* 1.82** 1.28* 0.36 -0.49
(0.94) (0.91) (0.74) (0.74) (1.13)
Technical change 2.83*** 1.30 1.97*** 1.02 -0.02
(use of digital networks) (0.95) (0.87) (0.76) (0.78) (1.17)
Number of observations 1095 1042 1083 888 416
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.05
A. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)




Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, 
listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy 
variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part-time) and 16 sectors. 
 
  25/43 
TABLE 2.1  
Changes in occupational structure due to internal and external movements 1996-1998 


















0.39 -0.42 0.47** 0.57 -1.00** 0.30 -0.00 -1.05 0.32 0.43
(0.25) (0.31) (0.23) (0.52) (0.51) (0.36) (0.55) (0.64) (0.53) (0.36)
Technical change 0.85*** -0.24 -0.21 -0.31 -0.08 0.91*** 0.03 -0.75 0.34 -0.53
(use of digital networks) (0.23) (0.33) (0.22) (0.51) (0.48) (0.31) (0.46) (0.58) (0.40) (0.38)
Number of observations 641 641 641 641 641 473 473 473 473 473
R-squared 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.08
0.17 -0.34 0.51** 0.74 -1.08** 0.35 -0.05 -0.85 0.52 0.03
(0.23) (0.31) (0.25) (0.49) (0.48) (0.34) (0.61) (0.68) (0.59) (0.42)
Technical change 0.71*** -0.10 -0.11 -0.39 -0.11 0.30 0.27 -0.51 0.22 -0.28
(use of digital networks) (0.23) (0.33) (0.23) (0.50) (0.49) (0.32) (0.51) (0.60) (0.46) (0.42)
Number of observations 641 641 641 641 641 473 473 473 473 473
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04
0.18 0.01 -0.05 -0.22 0.08 0.07 -0.10 -0.34 -0.09 0.45
(0.18) (0.22) (0.16) (0.36) (0.39) (0.29) (0.46) (0.44) (0.42) (0.34)
Technical change 0.18 -0.06 -0.15 0.02 0.01 0.54** -0.36 -0.08 0.17 -0.27
(use of digital networks) (0.18) (0.21) (0.15) (0.35) (0.37) (0.25) (0.39) (0.40) (0.33) (0.29)
Number of observations 641 641 641 641 641 473 473 473 473 473




A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements






Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
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TABLE 2.2  


















3.78** 1.70 4.76 4.26 -15.56 -5.14 14.19 -12.27 9.30 -96.90
(1.51) (1.92) (4.92) (4.98) (29.08) (5.51) (14.40) (18.37) (11.64) (178.04)
Technical change 0.36 0.83 7.28* 5.03 39.21 -3.57 -3.71 20.08 5.79 380.42
(use of digital networks) (1.37) (1.56) (3.98) (3.24) (35.68) (5.37) (5.64) (15.34) (9.35) (262.90)
Number of observations 635 634 634 631 538 455 460 470 379 252





Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
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TABLE 2.3  


















4.14* 11.66*** 1.75 4.89** 7.01 10.33*** 4.34 3.50 4.49 -95.11
(2.37) (4.30) (2.54) (2.30) (5.65) (3.62) (4.63) (3.08) (7.91) (99.58)
Technical change 8.86*** 5.01 7.18*** 3.49* 5.38 -0.19 0.43 2.45 1.01 -56.71
(use of digital networks) (2.40) (3.87) (2.55) (2.02) (4.96) (3.54) (4.26) (3.24) (6.66) (78.76)
Number of observations 633 625 624 625 463 464 427 463 267 183
R-squared 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.05
0.88 1.90* 1.37 0.53 -0.52 3.31** 1.70 1.13 -1.03 -1.91
(1.17) (1.03) (1.00) (0.81) (1.32) (1.58) (1.65) (1.15) (1.73) (1.86)
Technical change 4.72*** 2.22** 3.16*** 0.32 -0.77 0.53 -0.14 0.36 2.34 3.27
(use of digital networks) (1.26) (1.02) (1.03) (0.71) (1.31) (1.46) (1.61) (1.17) (2.27) (2.44)
Number of observations 631 620 622 624 315 464 422 461 264 101




A. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
B. Training hours per worker
A. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
B. Training hours per worker
 
Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
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TABLE 3.1  
Changes in occupational structure due to internal and external movements 1996-1998 


















0.40 -0.27 -0.19 -0.02 0.09 0.29 -0.28 -0.09 0.69 -0.61
(0.37) (0.52) (0.55) (0.69) (0.54) (0.22) (0.30) (0.31) (0.45) (0.45)
Technical change 0.96*** 0.19 -1.21*** 0.12 -0.06 0.88*** -0.44 0.05 -0.09 -0.40
(use of digital networks) (0.33) (0.46) (0.43) (0.53) (0.44) (0.22) (0.34) (0.29) (0.42) (0.43)
Number of observations 527 527 527 527 527 587 587 587 587 587
R-squared 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.10
0.61* -0.11 -0.28 0.37 -0.60 -0.02 -0.31 0.10 0.80* -0.58
(0.37) (0.58) (0.61) (0.70) (0.55) (0.18) (0.31) (0.29) (0.45) (0.45)
Technical change 0.44 0.61 -1.05** -0.12 0.11 0.75*** -0.34 0.06 -0.08 -0.39
(use of digital networks) (0.36) (0.50) (0.47) (0.57) (0.51) (0.19) (0.32) (0.29) (0.43) (0.42)
Number of observations 527 527 527 527 527 587 587 587 587 587
R-squared 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.19 0.08 0.11
-0.14 -0.34 -0.05 -0.13 0.66 0.30* 0.19 -0.19 -0.22 -0.09
(0.29) (0.43) (0.39) (0.46) (0.46) (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) (0.33) (0.32)
Technical change 0.48* -0.33 0.00 0.14 -0.29 0.14 -0.16 -0.05 0.07 -0.00
(use of digital networks) (0.26) (0.37) (0.34) (0.39) (0.37) (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.31) (0.33)
Number of observations 527 527 527 527 527 587 587 587 587 587





Small plants (less than 200 workers) Large plants (more than 200 workers)
Organisational change
Organisational change
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
 
Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
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TABLE 3.2  

















1.32 13.76 3.54 21.82** -78.96* 0.78 0.75 -6.16 -5.39* -46.20
(3.93) (13.94) (12.63) (10.72) (43.78) (2.33) (3.20) (9.58) (3.00) (110.34)
Technical change -0.16 -5.47 9.19 2.50 42.17 -2.03 0.80 12.37 7.25** 234.10
(use of digital networks) (3.71) (5.73) (11.70) (7.94) (59.50) (2.62) (2.05) (8.40) (3.58) (153.27)
Number of observations 511 510 517 459 339 579 584 587 551 451
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.07




Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
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TABLE 3.3  


















10.52*** 9.16** 5.27* 1.53 5.49 3.74* 8.73* 0.17 8.37** -25.96
(3.72) (4.19) (3.09) (4.03) (5.53) (2.25) (4.47) (2.53) (3.33) (34.81)
Technical change 6.02* 1.15 4.69* -2.33 7.27 3.61 3.77 5.37* 4.85* -11.87
(use of digital networks) (3.46) (3.44) (2.68) (3.81) (9.29) (2.34) (4.27) (2.89) (2.61) (20.69)
Number of observations 514 485 511 394 274 583 567 576 498 372
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.15 0.04
3.25** 2.00 2.27* 0.63 2.08 1.15 2.19** 0.40 -0.15 -1.79
(1.57) (1.59) (1.22) (1.32) (2.43) (1.17) (1.09) (0.99) (0.91) (1.33)
Technical change 3.26** 0.70 1.13 0.90 1.57 2.37** 1.29 2.71** 0.66 -1.39
(use of digital networks) (1.51) (1.42) (1.02) (1.30) (2.11) (1.20) (1.09) (1.13) (0.92) (1.35)
Number of observations 513 484 508 391 142 582 558 575 497 274
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.36 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.05
Organisational change
Organisational change
Small plants (less than 200 workers) Large plants (more than 200 workers)
A. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
B. Training hours per worker
A. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
B. Training hours per worker
 
Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
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TABLE 4.1  
Changes in occupational structure due to internal and external movements 1996-1998 



















0.05 -0.21 0.17 0.25 -0.26 0.57 -0.23 -0.31 0.73 -0.76*
(0.22) (0.35) (0.26) (0.58) (0.58) (0.35) (0.44) (0.49) (0.50) (0.44)
Technical change 0.52** 0.09 0.02 -1.02* 0.39 1.43*** -0.53 -0.73 0.61 -0.78*
(use of digital networks) (0.23) (0.36) (0.27) (0.52) (0.49) (0.30) (0.42) (0.47) (0.43) (0.40)
Number of observations 550 550 550 550 550 564 564 564 564 564
R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08
0.01 -0.01 0.34 0.11 -0.44 0.44 -0.32 -0.17 1.08** -1.03**
(0.23) (0.37) (0.29) (0.55) (0.51) (0.31) (0.49) (0.53) (0.51) (0.47)
Technical change 0.33 0.33 -0.03 -0.83 0.20 0.92*** -0.39 -0.55 0.32 -0.30
(use of digital networks) (0.26) (0.37) (0.29) (0.51) (0.49) (0.28) (0.43) (0.48) (0.46) (0.44)
Number of observations 550 550 550 550 550 564 564 564 564 564
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08
0.08 -0.15 -0.27 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.08 -0.13 -0.35 0.26
(0.17) (0.24) (0.26) (0.42) (0.43) (0.27) (0.36) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34)
Technical change 0.18 -0.21 0.18 -0.25 0.11 0.51** -0.16 -0.27 0.37 -0.44
(use of digital networks) (0.17) (0.25) (0.24) (0.36) (0.39) (0.23) (0.31) (0.28) (0.33) (0.30)
Number of observations 550 550 550 550 550 564 564 564 564 564
R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.06
Low-density local labor market High-density local labor market
Organisational change
Organisational change
A. Overall changes in the occupational structure
B. Internal movements






Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
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TABLE 4.2  


















2.61 8.03 -9.44 5.48 -13.84 -1.10 3.76 4.98 5.56 -92.90
(3.39) (11.11) (8.28) (6.13) (42.65) (2.91) (3.07) (13.37) (7.23) (114.14)
Technical change -1.97 -5.73 -0.53 -5.26 37.21 0.46 3.05 25.76** 17.16*** 282.15
(use of digital networks) (3.03) (4.34) (5.77) (4.58) (48.24) (3.29) (2.85) (12.57) (6.16) (176.40)
Number of observations 536 537 543 518 428 554 557 561 492 362
R-squared 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.07




Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
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6.30** 6.13 3.90 1.18 -0.21 7.16*** 12.90** 1.57 9.87** -32.71
(3.09) (3.93) (2.95) (2.74) (2.66) (2.63) (5.32) (2.63) (3.98) (53.83)
Technical change 7.80** -0.88 4.53* 3.15 2.52 1.96 5.78 5.18* 2.94 -42.09
(use of digital networks) (3.14) (4.22) (2.72) (2.82) (2.84) (2.63) (4.06) (2.83) (3.16) (57.50)
Number of observations 538 522 532 473 363 559 530 555 419 283
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.04
2.50* 1.97 2.22** 0.86 0.28 1.71 2.06 0.36 -0.84 -0.93
(1.40) (1.22) (1.11) (1.02) (1.45) (1.30) (1.34) (1.03) (1.13) (1.71)
Technical change 3.33** 1.24 2.69*** 0.23 -0.86 2.04 1.15 1.37 1.73 1.43
(use of digital networks) (1.43) (1.23) (1.04) (0.87) (1.61) (1.31) (1.25) (1.10) (1.24) (2.13)
Number of observations 538 518 531 470 241 557 524 552 418 175
R-squared 0.13 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.11
Organisational change
Organisational change
Low-density local labor market High-density local labor market
A. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
B. Training hours per worker
A. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
B. Training hours per worker
 
Notes           
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses      
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, 
public firms, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 
16 industries. 
 
  34/43 





















Change of labour share (in %)
Managers and professionals 0,77 1,14 1,39 0,93 0,54 0,67 0,85 0,43 1,10
Technicians and supervisors 0,56 0,43 0,43 0,72 0,36 0,27 0,82 0,67 0,46
Clerks -0,38 -0,53 -0,62 -0,27 -0,53 -0,32 -0,43 -0,06 -0,68
Skilled blue collars -0,01 0,29 -0,04 0,16 -0,24 -0,03 0,00 0,19 -0,21
Unskilled blue collars -0,94 -1,34 -1,16 -1,54 -0,13 -0,60 -1,25 -1,23 -0,66
Change of labour share through entries and exits (in %)
Managers and professionals -0,07 0,09 0,15 0,07 -0,26 -0,20 0,05 -0,15 0,01
Technicians and supervisors -0,13 -0,18 -0,33 -0,17 -0,09 -0,07 -0,19 -0,05 -0,22
Clerks 0,18 0,08 0,20 0,14 0,25 0,07 0,29 0,15 0,22
Skilled blue collars -0,41 -0,49 -0,34 -0,67 -0,05 -0,49 -0,34 -0,49 -0,33
Unskilled blue collars 0,43 0,50 0,31 0,63 0,15 0,69 0,20 0,54 0,32
Change of labour share through internal movements (in %)
Managers and professionals 0,92 1,14 1,30 0,90 0,93 0,99 0,85 0,67 1,16
Technicians and supervisors 0,79 0,70 0,85 0,96 0,56 0,47 1,08 0,81 0,78
Clerks -0,64 -0,70 -0,87 -0,41 -0,95 -0,53 -0,73 -0,35 -0,91
Skilled blue collars 0,40 0,82 0,31 0,85 -0,21 0,47 0,34 0,75 0,06
Unskilled blue collars -1,47 -1,95 -1,60 -2,31 -0,34 -1,40 -1,54 -1,87 -1,08
Excess turnover (in %)
Managers and professionals 24,12 23,96 21,77 18,54 31,89 25,37 23,01 24,17 24,06
Technicians and supervisors 25,13 25,70 19,24 13,95 40,55 33,56 17,78 26,77 23,56
Clerks 61,10 55,00 59,91 30,13 102,88 76,14 47,86 55,31 66,70
Skilled blue collars 26,42 26,30 27,26 16,18 43,47 35,69 18,70 24,39 28,56
Unskilled blue collars 155,88 122,49 223,36 108,07 257,93 126,42 178,02 127,02 190,00
Number of trainees per 100 workers
Managers and professionals 59,60 66,09 65,10 60,58 58,27 51,33 66,90 58,96 60,23
Technicians and supervisors 59,59 67,51 64,73 60,94 57,62 47,98 69,53 57,18 61,97
Clerks 41,27 45,61 46,67 43,82 37,83 33,89 47,82 39,93 42,56
Skilled blue collars 36,52 41,12 40,47 37,16 35,00 30,57 41,22 34,47 38,83
Unskilled blue collars 36,48 30,82 31,38 26,93 60,63 18,76 49,53 22,11 54,91
Subsample of plants that 
implemented…





Appendix Table A1 (continued) 
 
Hours of training per worker
Managers and professionals 21,45 23,99 24,54 22,70 19,75 16,85 25,51 21,20 21,69
Technicians and supervisors 19,45 21,85 21,69 19,97 18,69 15,22 23,12 18,35 20,54
Clerks 12,07 14,07 14,09 13,08 10,70 9,29 14,52 11,54 12,58
Skilled blue collars 6,31 7,00 7,11 6,10 6,79 5,19 7,19 5,53 7,18
Unskilled blue collars 6,59 6,72 6,88 6,90 5,61 5,57 7,11 6,24 7,07
Organisational change (dummy variable) 0,36 1,00 0,43 0,40 0,31 0,28 0,44 0,37 0,35
Introduction of computer and digital networks 0,46 0,54 1,00 0,50 0,40 0,36 0,54 0,41 0,50
Indicator for large plant (more than 200 workers) 0,53 0,64 0,63 0,62 0,40 0,00 1,00 0,51 0,54
Indicator for high-density local labor market (above median) 0,51 0,49 0,56 0,42 0,62 0,49 0,52 0,00 1,00
Indicator for service sector 0,42 0,36 0,37 0,00 1,00 0,54 0,33 0,32 0,52
Indicator for multi-establishment firm 0,60 0,67 0,65 0,63 0,56 0,54 0,66 0,59 0,62
Indicator for public sector 0,03 0,03 0,05 0,02 0,05 0,02 0,05 0,03 0,04
Indicator for listed company 0,43 0,52 0,52 0,55 0,27 0,27 0,58 0,41 0,45
Indicator for presence of union delegates 0,77 0,85 0,82 0,84 0,69 0,62 0,91 0,74 0,81
Share of women (%) 35,13 33,96 32,64 25,98 47,53 35,96 34,39 34,30 35,93
Indicator for part-time work (>5% of workforce) 0,37 0,36 0,36 0,22 0,58 0,33 0,41 0,35 0,39
Indicator for delayering 0,41 0,56 0,53 0,51 0,28 0,32 0,49 0,42 0,40
Indicator for just-in-time 0,51 0,54 0,56 0,63 0,34 0,43 0,58 0,57 0,44
Indicator for total quality management 0,67 0,73 0,73 0,82 0,48 0,58 0,76 0,70 0,65
Indicator for computer assisted systems 0,63 0,73 0,74 0,84 0,35 0,47 0,78 0,69 0,58
Indicator for PC use by at least 50% of workers 0,30 0,34 0,47 0,24 0,38 0,25 0,35 0,20 0,40
Number of observations 1114 402 507 641 473 527 587 550 564
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Changes in occupational structure, excess turnover and training  










Personal computers 1.25*** 0.11 -0.42 -0.95** 0.00
(0.25) (0.33) (0.33) (0.39) (0.33)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-Squared 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Personal computers 0.86*** 0.30 -0.72** -0.81** 0.37
(0.23) (0.36) (0.35) (0.39) (0.35)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-Squared 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07
Personal computers 0.39** -0.23 0.30 -0.10 -0.35
(0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) (0.22)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-Squared 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03
Personal computers 3.83* 4.00 4.58 6.14 -27.40
(2.12) (4.34) (6.56) (4.32) (63.74)
Number of observations 1090 1094 1104 1010 790
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.03
Personal computers 0.51 6.11* 3.83* 7.17*** -5.69
(2.23) (3.69) (2.08) (2.34) (12.34)
Number of observations 1097 1052 1087 892 646
R-Squared 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.03
Personal computers 1.81* 1.32 1.69** 1.00 -0.17
(1.06) (1.01) (0.85) (0.83) (1.17)
Number of observations 1095 1042 1083 888 416
R-Squared 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.05
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker





Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for organisational change. They also include controls for 
plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density 
labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union 
delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 
5% of workers being part- time) and 16 sectors. 
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Changes in occupational structure, excess turnover and training  











Computer assisted systems 0.26 0.39 -0.13 -0.69* 0.17
(0.25) (0.33) (0.39) (0.40) (0.36)
Number of observations 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
R-Squared 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Computer assisted systems 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.11 0.09
(0.26) (0.35) (0.40) (0.45) (0.40)
Number of observations 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
R-Squared 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07
Computer assisted systems 0.21 0.41 -0.13 -0.39 -0.10
(0.19) (0.27) (0.22) (0.30) (0.28)
Number of observations 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
R-Squared 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03
Computer assisted systems 4.43 -6.78* -3.52 -22.22*** -27.52
(4.01) (3.54) (8.56) (6.52) (87.03)
Number of observations 1088 1092 1102 1008 790
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.03
Computer assisted systems 1.34 3.68 2.39 5.48* -15.13
(2.66) (3.20) (2.39) (3.20) (25.21)
Number of observations 1095 1050 1085 892 646
R-Squared 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.03
Computer assisted systems 2.85** 1.53 0.18 1.68 -1.17
(1.20) (1.13) (0.90) (1.05) (1.37)
Number of observations 1093 1040 1081 888 416
R-Squared 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.05
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker





Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for organisational change. They also include controls for plant size 
(dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-
establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the 
labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers being part- time) and 16 sectors. 
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Delayering 0.09 -0.09 0.46* 0.15 -0.60*
(0.21) (0.28) (0.26) (0.35) (0.32)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-Squared 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06
Delayering 0.16 -0.54* 0.67** 0.07 -0.37
(0.21) (0.28) (0.28) (0.36) (0.33)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-Squared 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07
Delayering -0.06 0.29 -0.12 0.13 -0.24
(0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.26) (0.26)
Number of observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
R-Squared 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03
Delayering -0.44 0.13 4.47 -2.19 -99.25*
(1.91) (3.71) (8.05) (3.85) (54.85)
Number of observations 1090 1094 1104 1010 790
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.03
Delayering 1.44 -2.59 -1.26 2.91 -4.66
(2.01) (3.06) (1.89) (2.23) (16.05)
Number of observations 1097 1052 1087 892 646
R-Squared 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.03
Delayering 1.00 1.65* -0.27 1.56* 3.47***
(0.95) (0.87) (0.71) (0.82) (1.10)
Number of observations 1095 1042 1083 888 416
R-Squared 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.07
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker





Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for the use of computer and digital networks. They also include 
controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-density 
labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union delegates, 
share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of workers  
being part- time) and 16 sectors. 
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Appendix Table A3 - 2 
Changes in occupational structure, excess turnover and training  











Just-in-Time -0.18 0.09 -0.16 0.74** -0.48
(0.21) (0.27) (0.26) (0.32) (0.31)
Number of observations 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
R-Squared 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06
Just-in-Time -0.15 0.10 0.21 0.65* -0.81**
(0.20) (0.29) (0.28) (0.34) (0.33)
Number of observations 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
R-Squared 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Just-in-Time -0.06 -0.04 -0.29 0.24 0.14
(0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.27) (0.26)
Number of observations 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
R-Squared 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03
Just-in-Time -2.53 1.45 -1.18 -0.50 -66.42
(1.86) (3.38) (7.84) (4.21) (51.10)
Number of observations 1076 1080 1091 996 783
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.03
Just-in-Time 2.73 2.90 -1.46 2.54 -6.00
(2.12) (3.24) (1.95) (2.08) (6.38)
Number of observations 1083 1038 1073 883 640
R-Squared 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.03
Just-in-Time 1.90* 2.65*** -0.39 0.81 0.22
(1.00) (0.95) (0.75) (0.62) (1.11)
Number of observations 1081 1028 1069 879 414
R-Squared 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.05
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker





Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for the use of computer and digital networks. They also include 
controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-
density labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union 
delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of 
workers being part- time) and 16 sectors. 
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Appendix Table A3 - 3 
Changes in occupational structure, excess turnover and training  











Total quality management 0.27 0.33 0.38 -0.48 -0.49
(0.23) (0.29) (0.36) (0.37) (0.33)
Number of observations 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
R-Squared 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
Total quality management -0.13 -0.03 0.69* -0.33 -0.21
(0.20) (0.31) (0.37) (0.42) (0.37)
Number of observations 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
R-Squared 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07
Total quality management 0.39** 0.26 -0.42* 0.03 -0.27
(0.18) (0.24) (0.24) (0.28) (0.28)
Number of observations 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
R-Squared 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03
Total quality management -1.59 -0.76 -21.43** -11.06** -188.41**
(3.79) (5.88) (8.91) (5.19) (94.30)
Number of observations 1088 1092 1102 1008 789
R-Squared 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.04
Total quality management 4.25* -1.10 1.69 5.86* -22.12
(2.41) (3.94) (2.10) (3.34) (32.12)
Number of observations 1095 1050 1085 890 645
R-Squared 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.03
Total quality management 1.62 0.49 0.16 0.28 0.89
(1.08) (1.12) (0.79) (0.89) (1.32)
Number of observations 1093 1040 1081 886 416
R-Squared 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.05
E. Number of trainees (per 100 workers)
F. Training hours per worker





Notes:      
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for the use of computer and digital networks. They also include 
controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 employees), being located on a high-
density labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, listed companies, presence of union 
delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy variable for firms with more than 5% of 
workers being part- time) and 16 sectors. 
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Appendix Table A4 
Changes in the occupational structure, excess turnover and training 











Chorga (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 0.40 -0.44 0.66 0.10 -0.71
(0.44) (0.58) (0.56) (0.87) (0.85)
Network (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 0.62 0.47 -0.75* -0.95 0.61
(0.41) (0.57) (0.45) (0.74) (0.69)
Chorga x high density 0.54 -0.30 0.16 0.30 -0.70
(0.42) (0.57) (0.50) (0.73) (0.69)
Network x high density 0.92** -0.90* -0.49 1.45** -0.98*
(0.36) (0.52) (0.48) (0.64) (0.59)
Chorga x large plant -0.23 0.12 -0.36 0.69 -0.21
(0.47) (0.61) (0.66) (0.80) (0.74)
Network x large plant -0.16 -0.62 1.21** -0.02 -0.42
(0.42) (0.57) (0.54) (0.68) (0.63)
Chorga x service sector -0.41 0.69 -1.70** -0.44 1.86***
(0.48) (0.66) (0.69) (0.76) (0.68)
Network x service sector -0.14 0.32 -0.15 0.35 -0.37
(0.42) (0.60) (0.60) (0.68) (0.62)
Chorga (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 0.48 -0.18 0.56 0.32 -1.18
(0.45) (0.59) (0.58) (0.80) (0.78)
Network (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 0.28 0.77 -0.67 -0.93 0.55
(0.47) (0.60) (0.48) (0.75) (0.73)
Chorga x high density 0.43 -0.42 -0.07 0.66 -0.61
(0.37) (0.59) (0.55) (0.71) (0.68)
Network x high density 0.72** -0.99* -0.39 0.95 -0.28
(0.34) (0.54) (0.52) (0.66) (0.62)
Chorga x large plant -0.68 -0.11 0.07 0.24 0.48
(0.43) (0.62) (0.67) (0.77) (0.73)
Network x large plant 0.27 -0.74 1.06* -0.03 -0.56
(0.42) (0.59) (0.57) (0.71) (0.67)
Chorga x service sector -0.13 0.50 -1.42** -0.33 1.38**
(0.42) (0.68) (0.72) (0.75) (0.69)
Network x service sector -0.45 0.39 -0.01 0.69 -0.62
(0.41) (0.62) (0.65) (0.71) (0.66)
Chorga (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) -0.09 -0.39 -0.04 0.02 0.50
(0.31) (0.42) (0.39) (0.62) (0.65)
Network (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 0.34 -0.10 0.04 -0.26 -0.03
(0.29) (0.38) (0.34) (0.54) (0.55)
Chorga x high density 0.06 0.11 0.34 -0.36 -0.14
(0.32) (0.44) (0.40) (0.58) (0.52)
Network x high density 0.25 0.12 -0.40 0.63 -0.60
(0.28) (0.39) (0.36) (0.50) (0.46)
Chorga x large plant 0.42 0.53 -0.29 0.05 -0.71
(0.34) (0.47) (0.41) (0.61) (0.56)
Network x large plant -0.40 -0.09 0.02 0.22 0.24
(0.31) (0.42) (0.38) (0.53) (0.50)
Chorga x service sector -0.10 0.07 -0.38 -0.06 0.47
(0.35) (0.52) (0.46) (0.67) (0.54)
Network x service sector 0.20 -0.29 0.16 -0.20 0.13
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Appendix Table A4 (follow) 
Changes in the occupational structure, excess turnover and training 
according to sector, size, and local labour market density 
 
Chorga (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 5.92 11.45 4.31 22.20** 38.83
(4.13) (13.17) (14.37) (10.78) (122.36)
Network (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) -2.34 -10.42 -11.80 -3.54 -141.90
(4.16) (7.52) (13.09) (8.32) (163.23)
Chorga x high density -1.62 -7.81 25.51* 0.79 -72.27
(5.15) (14.00) (13.69) (9.56) (76.24)
Network x high density 6.09 13.66 32.47** 21.68** 100.33
(5.60) (8.66) (12.96) (8.41) (89.00)
Chorga x large plant -1.20 -9.96 -14.25 -26.68** -51.18
(4.82) (11.51) (16.19) (10.54) (150.55)
Network x large plant 0.70 8.98 13.37 1.40 202.90
(4.97) (7.42) (15.71) (9.42) (182.35)
Chorga x service sector -9.39 10.90 -31.61 -1.95 -55.38
(6.57) (15.45) (20.75) (12.73) (185.13)
Network x service sector -5.03 -7.76 0.63 -5.92 401.04
(5.57) (7.13) (16.37) (10.85) (299.02)
Chorga (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 7.82* 10.11** 6.84 -2.07 29.22
(4.48) (4.97) (4.37) (4.80) (30.57)
Network (ref: small, low dens, manuf.) 12.89*** 1.88 7.39* -0.81 31.07
(4.28) (4.84) (4.05) (4.34) (28.87)
Chorga x high density -0.18 9.69 -3.08 8.27* 6.62
(4.12) (7.52) (3.80) (4.64) (21.07)
Network x high density -3.17 5.16 -0.18 -1.29 -32.39
(4.14) (6.45) (3.69) (4.66) (40.46)
Chorga x large plant -5.64 -3.29 -5.48 5.81 -41.81
(4.26) (5.74) (4.23) (5.17) (45.79)
Network x large plant -3.57 1.81 -0.82 7.90* -30.69
(4.11) (5.63) (4.07) (4.65) (33.63)
Chorga x service sector 4.36 -12.40* 0.50 -1.00 -86.23
(4.52) (6.76) (4.27) (8.55) (73.06)
Network x service sector -10.73** -6.43 -4.30 -0.21 -34.70






(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(3) Regressions in all panels include controls for plant size (dummy variable for plants with more than 200 
employees), being located on a high-density labour market, multi-establishment firms, public sector companies, 
listed companies, presence of union delegates, share of women in the labour force, part-time work (dummy 










In this appendix, we detail the key steps taken in preparing the data. The data sources are 
described in the data section in the text. 
 
We start from a sample of 2894 plants from the REPONSE (1998) survey, with 
information on technical and organisational changes as well as key firm and plant 
characteristics. Matching this sample with the DMMO-EMMO, ESE and 24-83 sources 
yields a sample of 1537 plants. 
The relatively low matching rate (53%) is due, in particular, to the fact that the EMMO is 
not an exhaustive data source (plants are sampled at a rate that depends on their size) and 
that the 24-83 fiscal forms are not systematically coded.  
In order to achieve this matching rate, we extrapolate some of the missing data, using the 
following procedures: 
- when a plant is only present for 1 (resp. 2) of the 3 years in the 24-83 database, 
we compute the training variables as averages over 1 (resp. 2) years instead of 3; 
- when a plant is missing for some trimesters in a given year in the EMMO-DMMO 
data, we extrapolate the entries and exits in each occupation from the entries and 
exits observed during the rest of the year; if a plant is missing during one (or two) 
of the three years, we extrapolate entries and exits from the other years. 
Though these extrapolations introduce measurement error in the movement and training 
variables, this does not bias the estimates as these are dependent variables in the 
regressions (it might, however, make them less precise). Moreover, we checked that 
restricting the sample to those plants that have complete DMMO-EMMO information 
does not significantly alter the results. 
We then perform several consistency checks on this 1537 plant sample. First, we check 
that the total plant size declared in the ESE does not differ too much from the one 
declared in the DMMO-EMMO sources, at the beginning and at the end of our period 
(Dec 31, 1995 and Dec 31, 1998). We drop all plants for which the difference is more 
than 20% (representing at least 10 workers). 
Second, we check for outliers in the changes in the occupational structure. We drop 
plants for which the sum of the absolute changes in the share of the different occupations 
is more than 60% (representing more than 10 workers). 
Again, we checked the robustness of our results to this procedure. We applied stricter 
consistency criteria (differences smaller than 10% in plant size across sources, and sum 
of absolute changes below 40%). The results are preserved. 
The final sample has 1114 plants. 
 
The data on local labour market density (the number of employed and unemployed 
workers per square kilometres, computed over 358 local labour markets) comes from the 
1990 population census. 
